An open problem in approval-based multiwinner voting concerns whether we can efficiently compute committees that satisfy both justified representation and Pareto optimality. We answer this question negatively by proving that, on the domain of all profiles, ou...
VQV Signal
Jointly Satisfying Pareto Optimality and Justified Representation is NP-Hard in Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting
An open problem in approval-based multiwinner voting concerns whether we can efficiently compute committees that satisfy both justified representation and Pareto optimality. We answer this question negatively by proving that, on the domain of all profiles, ou...
An open problem in approval-based multiwinner voting concerns whether we can efficiently compute committees that satisfy both justified representation and Pareto optimality. We answer this question negatively by proving that, on the domain of all profiles, outputting a committee satisfying both axioms is NP-hard....
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